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Although delusion is one of the central concepts of 
psychopathology, it stills eludes precise conceptualization. 
In this paper, I present certain basic issues concerning 
the classification and definition of delusion, as well as its 
ontological status. By examining these issues, I aim to shed 
light on the ambiguity of the clinical term ‘delusion’ and its 
extension, as well as provide clues as to why philosophers are 
increasingly joining the ranks of psychiatrists, psychologists, 
and neuroscientists in the effort to come to a comprehensive 
understanding of delusion.
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Introduction
Delusion is one of the central concepts of psychopathology. It 
has been considered ‘the basic characteristic of madness’ (Jaspers, 
1913/1963, p. 93), as well as the main criterion when assessing 
and diagnosing psychosis. The detection of delusions has profound 
consequences for diagnosis and treatment, as well as for the prediction of 
behavior and the attribution of responsibility. Yet, for all its importance, 
delusion has eluded precise conceptualization. In what follows, I will 
present the most fundamental theoretical challenges involving the 
classification and definition of delusion, as well as presenting the more 
philosophical consideration of whether delusion is a natural kind. In this 
review article, I aim to show that ‘delusion’ is a highly ambiguous term, 
and that the phenomena to which it refers are multi-faceted. Additionally, 
I aim to shed light on why philosophers have taken an interest in 
delusions, increasingly joining the ranks of psychiatrists, psychologists, 
and neuroscientists in the effort to arrive at a comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomena.
The classification of delusion
Delusions occur in a variety of contexts, including paranoid 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, 
Lewy body dementia, epilepsy, and acquired brain injury. Delusions have 
been grouped in many different ways. 
The context of delusion, for example, was once a criterion for 
dividing delusions into organic and functional. A delusion was called 
organic if was the result of brain injury, and functional if it had no known 
organic cause (which usually entailed a psychodynamic, or motivational, 
explanation). The distinction is now considered to be obsolete, as the 
development of neuropsychiatry has increasingly lent credibility to the 
view that all delusions have an organic basis, even though some have not 
been precisely identified yet. 
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Delusions are perhaps most intuitively classified according to their content 
— that is, according to what the delusion is about. Not only pre-twentieth-century 
inventories bear witness to this characteristic (Berrios, 1996), but it also has  made 
its way into current classifications. For example, the section ‘Schizophrenia 
Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders’ of the current edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) states that the content of 
schizophrenic delusions may include a variety of themes, such as persecutory, 
referential, grandiose, erotomanic, nihilistic, and somatic. Persecutory delusions 
involve the conviction that one is being, or is going to be, harmed or harassed by 
an individual or organization; delusions of reference involve the conviction that 
certain gestures, comments, and environmental cues are directed at oneself; 
grandiose delusions involve the conviction that one has exceptional abilities, wealth, 
or fame; erotomanic delusions involve the conviction that another person, usually 
of high status or famous, is in love with the patient; nihilistic delusions involve 
the conviction that a major catastrophe will occur; and somatic delusions focus on 
preoccupations regarding health and organ function (APA, 2013, p. 87). The thematic 
families listed in the DSM are some of the most clinically common — especially 
persecutory delusions and delusions of reference — but the list is not meant to be 
exhaustive. Indeed, it only scratches the surface of the thematic variety of delusion. 
In his lauded General Psychopathology, Karl Jaspers effected a shift in 
the classification of delusions from their content to their formal or structural 
features, such as their comprehensibility. For Jaspers, the psychiatrist’s inability to 
achieve an empathetic understanding of the patient’s experience was the true 
sign of madness and it was the chief criterion for his distinction between primary 
delusions (or delusions proper) and secondary delusions (or delusion-like ideas). 
Jaspers maintained that the former cannot be understood phenomenologically and 
originate in what he describes as a ‘transformation in our total awareness of reality’ 
(1913/1963, p. 95) while the latter originate in understandable ways from experience. 
This shift from an extensional to an intensional classification is felt in the 
distinction between bizarre and nonbizarre delusions — a distinction of some 
clinical importance, as the DSM treats the presence of bizarre delusions as the 
heaviest-weighted clinical criterion of schizophrenia. According to the DSM, 
delusions are deemed bizarre when two conditions are met: first, they are clearly 
implausible and incomprehensible to same-culture peers; second, they are not 
derived from ordinary life experiences (APA, 2013, p. 87). Instances of delusion 
that seem to satisfy these criteria abound in the clinical literature. For example, 
one patient had the delusion that there was a nuclear power station inside his 
body (David, 1990); another, that he was both in Boston and in Paris at the same 
time (Weinstein and Kahn, 1955). Much more common, however, are delusions 
that do not satisfy the criteria for bizarre delusion; that is, delusions that appear 
R E V I S T A 
L A T I N O A M E R I C A N A 
D E  P S I C O P A T O L O G I A 
F U N D A M E N T A L
170
Rev. Latinoam. Psicopat. Fund., São Paulo, 19(1), 167-181, mar. 2016
somewhat understandable and derived from ordinary life experiences. As an 
example, the DSM alludes to the conviction that one is under surveillance by the 
police, despite a lack of convincing evidence.
Finally, a recent and useful distinction divides the set of delusions into 
monothematic and polythematic (Coltheart, 2013). A monothematic delusion 
is one that is specific to a particular theme. It contrasts with polythematic 
delusion, in which case patients exhibit many delusions concerning a variety 
of themes. Monothematic delusions are typically not elaborated and not 
integrated (or not completely integrated) with the rest of the patient’s beliefs, 
while polythematic delusions are both elaborated and integrated. Monothematic 
delusions are commonly the consequence of acquired brain injury. Examples 
of delusions that present as monothematic include those that are referred to as 
Delusional Misidentification Syndromes, such as Capgras delusion, Frégoli 
delusion, and reduplicative paramnesia. Polythematic delusions are often and 
appropriately referred to as delusional systems, being most commonly associated 
with schizophrenia. Capgras delusion, described by Joseph Capgras and Jean 
Reboul-Lachaux in 1923, typically involves the conviction that one’s loved ones 
(typically one’s relatives or spouse) have been replaced by doubles — impostors 
which are usually human, but in some cases may be ghosts, aliens, or robots. 
Frégoli delusion, described by Paul Courbon and Gustave Fail in 1927, typically 
involves the conviction that strangers are actually familiar individuals in disguise, 
or that different people are in fact a single person who changes appearance or is 
in disguise. Finally, reduplicative paramnesia, named by Arnold Pick in 1903 and, 
in all indication, first described by Charles Bonnet in 1788, typically involves 
the conviction that a location has been duplicated, existing in two or more places 
simultaneously, or that it has been relocated to another site.
Perhaps the most famous case of polythematic delusion in psychiatric 
history remains that of Daniel Paul Schreber, an appellate judge in the kingdom of 
Saxony who spent thirteen years in mental asylums and wrote of his experiences 
with schizophrenia in Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (Schreber, 1903/2000) — a 
fame that was due in no small part to the fact that his account was the subject of 
a major study by Freud, as well as being extensively explored by Bleuler, and 
offered as an example of schizophrenic incomprehensibility by Jaspers. The core 
of Schreber’s delusional system included the conviction that he had a mission to 
redeem the world and to restore mankind to their lost state of bliss. In order for 
this to happen, he insisted, divine forces were preparing him for a sexual union 
with God by changing him into a woman, so he could give birth to a new race of 
humanity. Schreber never disavowed what he termed ‘my so-called delusions’ and 
died in an asylum in 1911. 
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The definition of delusion
To provide a definition of delusion that satisfies the needs of both 
psychopathological theory and clinical practice is a difficult task. The first two 
editions of the DSM — DSM-I (1952) and DSM-II (1968) — did not provide one, 
but with the inclusion of the section ‘Glossary of Technical Terms’ in the DSM-III 
(1980), the manual came to define delusion as follows:
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly 
held despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes 
incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not 
ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or subculture (i.e., it 
is not an article of religious faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, 
it is regarded as a delusion only when the judgment is so extreme as to defy 
credibility. (APA, 2013, p. 819) 
Reflection upon and attention to the clinical literature raise a number of 
difficulties concerning this attempt at a definition (e.g. Leeser and O’Donohue, 
1999). Does delusion have to be false? Consider a case of Othello syndrome — 
the delusion that one’s spouse or sexual partner is being unfaithful — discussed 
by Jaspers, in which the stress provoked by living through the morbid jealousy 
of her husband causes the patient’s wife to find consolation in another man’s 
arms, thereby verifying the patient’s delusion. Nothing in the patient’s mind has 
changed: he still holds that his wife is unfaithful without having any evidential 
justification. So it is not the truth-value of the proposition or propositions held 
by delusional patients that is epistemologically interesting to the characterization 
of delusions, but the fact that they are ‘sustained despite what constitutes 
incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary’, etc. As Golda 
Meir is reputed to have quipped after being accused of being paranoid by Henry 
Kissinger for hesitating to grant further concessions to the Arabs during the 1973 
Sinai talks, ‘Even paranoids have enemies’.
Does delusion have to be based on inference? As Martin Davies and 
colleagues (2001, p. 134) observe, a subject might form a delusional belief 
simply by taking an anomalous perceptual experience to be true, and it is not 
obvious why this might involve an inferential step. Furthermore, Philip Gerrans 
has advanced a theory that relieves the emphasis on hypothesis confirmation to 
which the inferential view alludes, proposing that processes of selective attention 
and recall exert their effects instead on autobiographical narrative. In his words, 
‘Someone with a delusion is not a mad scientist but an unreliable narrator’ 
(2009, p. 152). Therefore, the inferential nature of delusion formation is a point 
of contention. This raises the further question of whether definitions of mental 
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disorders should include explicitly theoretical elements. 
Does delusion have to be about external reality? Consider delusions that 
concern the subject’s own body — such as manifestations of Cotard’s syndrome 
in which the patient affirms that some of her internal organs are missing, or 
somatoparaphrenia, which involves the denial of ownership of one or more of one’s 
limbs or sometimes an entire side of one’s body — or delusions that concern the 
subject’s own thoughts — such as thought insertion, in which the subject reports 
that another’s thoughts occur in her own mind without her volition. Whether it 
is about “external” or “internal” reality — a terminology so vague as to merit 
scientific disrepute — is of no consequence to the delusional character of a belief. 
Does delusion have to be firmly sustained? While that may be the case 
in many if not most manifestations, the conviction of delusional subjects is 
subject to fluctuation. At least some delusional patients show appreciation of the 
implausibility of their delusional beliefs. Consider, for example, the following 
excerpt of an interview with a patient who maintained that his house and family 
had been replaced by duplicates: 
E: Isn’t that [two families] unusual? 
S: It was unbelievable! 
E: How do you account for it? 
S: I don’t know. I try to understand it myself, and it was virtually impossible. 
E: What if I told you I don’t believe it? 
S: That’s perfectly understandable. In fact, when I tell the story, I feel that I’m 
concocting a story ... It’s not quite right. Something is wrong. 
E: If someone told you the story, what would you think? 
S: I would find it extremely hard to believe. I should be defending myself. 
(Alexander, Stuss, and Benson, 1979, p. 335) 
Furthermore, does delusion have to contradict what almost everyone else 
believes? Or: does the attribution of delusion have to take into consideration 
the person’s culture or subculture? Davies and colleagues (2001, p. 133) object 
that if a bizarrely implausible belief is formed and sustained in ways that are 
characteristic of delusions, it seems that it should be grouped together with 
delusions even if many other subjects believe the same thing. However, as ad hoc 
a clause as it may seem, cultural exemption may make sense of the fact that we 
do not think that individuals who belong to other cultures which hold peculiar 
beliefs are delusional. Dominic Murphy reports on the fieldwork done by Wendy 
James in the Sudan, where it is believed that trees convey information: ‘You can 
learn what they know by burning an ebony twig, dipping it in water and reading 
the pattern of ashes in the water’ (2013, p. 119). The cultural exemption clause 
encodes into the definition of delusion the fact that we would attribute a delusion 
to someone in our (Western) culture if they held that they gathered knowledge 
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about the plans of witches from trees, but not with respect to the Uduk. However, 
as with the inferential nature of delusion formation, the cultural exemption clause 
is again a point of contention. 
Does delusion have to occur in the face of incontrovertible and 
obvious proof or evidence to the contrary? Consider the case of mirrored-self 
misidentification — the delusion that one’s reflection in the mirror is not one’s 
own. It sometimes is accompanied by the conviction that whoever the person in 
the mirror is, he or she is following the subject around. Now, are these patients 
in possession of ‘incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence’ that, although 
they fail to identify the face in the mirror, it is nevertheless theirs? Consider that 
just as not all hallucinatory symptoms lead to delusion, an otherwise normal 
subject presented with the anomalous experience of not recognizing oneself in 
the mirror would presumably not arrive at the belief that, say — although the 
mirrored person is waving just like I am, wearing the same clothes, sporting the 
same hairstyle, etc. — that person is not me. In addition to these overriding facts 
(which point to the great plausibility that there is something wrong with me), the 
testimony of each and everyone of one’s epistemic peers would also weigh in 
heavily in the reasoning of a person whose thoughts did not mark the presence of 
some deficit, or bias, or both. So imperviousness to evidence does indeed seem to 
be a central feature of delusion.
Indeed, delusion is often not only impervious to evidence that tells against 
it, but it also persists in spite of bad consequences — even self-perceived harmful 
and imprudent consequences. A final observation of the inadequacy of the DSM 
definition is that it captures exclusively epistemological features, failing to take 
the disruption of day-to-day functioning into account (McKay et al., 2009) — 
that which is typically the focus of clinical concern and treatment. It ultimately 
ignores the fact that, as George Graham sums up, ‘Living through a delusion 
hurts a person’ (2010, p. 203, my emphasis). 
The ontology of delusion
The fact that the standard definition of delusion has proved so problematic 
raises the question of whether delusion can ever be given a proper definition 
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Put another way, it raises the 
question of whether all the various types of delusion we have discussed share 
a common essence, something to which we could refer in order to ultimately 
decide if something is or is not a delusion. Is delusion a class of things akin to 
quarks, noble gases, and tigers, in their suitability for the purposes of scientific 
investigation? Does delusion as a kind “carve nature at its joints,” latching on to a 
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real distinction in nature? In other words, is delusion a natural kind?
‘Natural kind’ is philosophical jargon and, therefore, the question ‘Is 
delusion a natural kind?’ merits further analysis. Beyond depending on an 
investigation of the characteristics of delusions as a whole, an answer to it will 
be determined by one’s view of what requisites a class of things should fulfill 
in order for it to be considered a natural kind. The traditional account of natural 
kinds is represented by various forms of essentialism, which usually involves 
three main tenets (Ereshefsky, 2009). First, all and only the members of a kind 
share a common essence. Second, that essence is a property, or a set of properties, 
that all the members of a kind must have. And third, a kind’s essence causes the 
other properties associated with that kind. So, for example, the essence of gold 
is gold’s atomic structure, and that atomic structure occurs in all and only pieces 
of gold. That structure is a property that all gold must have as opposed to such 
accidental properties as being valuable to humans. And the atomic structure of 
gold causes pieces of gold to have the properties associated with that kind, 
such as readily dissolving in mercury at room temperature, conducting heat and 
electricity, and being unaffected by air and moisture. 
As essentialism holds that natural kinds exist independently of our 
classifications, it behooves scientists to discover their inherent essences 
and classify them accordingly. The conceptualization of scientific kinds as 
essentialistic natural kinds has indeed been applied with success, especially in 
physics and chemistry, but is it applicable to psychiatric kinds, or even biological 
kinds? Can psychiatric disorders and symptoms be exhaustively defined by fixed 
and inherent properties? Can delusion, in light of the fact that the conditions in its 
standard definition are not necessary or even jointly sufficient? 
On the other hand, assuming that there is no essential criterion or set of 
criteria for being a delusion does not, by itself, entail that delusion as a kind is 
nothing but an arbitrary clustering of properties. ‘Delusion’ picks out reasonably 
stable, nonarbitrary patterns, and application of delusion as a classification seems 
justified by its usefulness for clinical purposes (Bell et al., 2006). In consonance 
with these observations, Peter Zachar (2000) has proposed that mental disorders 
be conceptualized as practical kinds. As an example, Zachar (2014, pp. 154-5) 
alludes to the distinction between an adult and a child. Although the kinds 
‘adult’ and ‘child’ are not in themselves sharply demarcated, the uses for 
which we deploy them will determine where their boundaries should be drawn. 
Consequently, many distinctions between adults and children are context-
dependent. For example, if our aim is to decide who is able to vote, engage in 
consensual sex, get married, be sent to prison, drink alcohol, or enter into a legal 
contract, each of those considerations will result in different ways of demarcating 
adulthood (Horwitz and Wakefield, 2012, p. 53). 
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Is Zachar right in arguing that psychiatric kinds are practical kinds 
that pick out mind-dependent distinctions? Or do they pick out mind-
independent distinctions in nature? Importantly, what is the relevant sense 
of mind-independence with regard to the characterization of natural kinds? 
Richard Samuels argues that it is what Sam Page (2006) calls individuative 
independence: ‘Roughly  put, a kind, K, is individuatively independent if it is 
circumscribed by boundaries that are totally independent of where we draw 
the lines. In other words, individuatively independent kinds are the sorts of 
kinds whose existence does not (metaphysically) depend on how we categorize 
things’ (Samuels, 2009, p. 54). Page illustrates his concept by alluding to the 
individuation of the night sky into constellations: ‘Though it is prima facie 
plausible that reality is individuated intrinsically into stars, reality is not 
individuated intrinsically  into constellations, since it is people who divide the 
night sky into constellations’ (Page, 2006, p. 328). Furthermore, although the 
International Astronomical Union divides the celestial sphere into 88 official 
constellations, there can be as many different star maps as there are people willing 
to point out a few stars and name clusters of stars. 
With respect to individuative independence, then, Zachar’s practical kinds 
model has the import of making psychiatric kinds out to be akin to constellations 
rather than stars. However, since psychiatric kinds are manifold and differ greatly 
with respect to validity, it is possible for some to be mind-dependent kinds, and 
for others to turn out to be mind-independent — and, among those that are merely 
mind-dependent kinds, some may be practical kinds in Zachar’s sense, while others 
may not even rise to such a status. With regard to the specific case of delusion, three 
considerations put pressure on the assumption that it constitutes a mind-independent 
kind. First, delusions may be an artifact of our folk psychology, our commonsense 
mode of thought about mental states and processes, as Murphy (2006) proposes: 
Whether or not something is a delusion is a matter of how it strikes us, and that 
depends on how well it comports with our understanding of what people are 
like, both in general terms and within our culture. It does not depend on some 
psychological mechanism or a formal property of beliefs. (p. 180) 
Murphy’s observation that being a delusion is a response-dependent 
property stems from reflection on the attribution of delusion. He argues that a 
delusion is attributed to a subject when our explanatory resources run out and 
we cannot make sense of how and why someone has a certain belief: ‘a delusion 
is a belief that is acquired in ways that defeat our expectations about belief 
acquisition’ (2013, p. 117). 
Second, as I have pointed out when discussing the cultural exemption clause 
in the DSM definition of delusion, what is considered a delusion in one place (or at 
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one time) may not be considered in another. This ties neatly with Murphy’s theory 
of delusion attribution as a failure of folk epistemology to account for someone’s 
acquiring a belief, as what will count as a reason for holding a belief will ultimately 
depend on the context of attribution. Consider again the example of Sudan’s Uduk-
speaking peoples. Believing that ebony trees can eavesdrop on conversations and 
that information about such conversations can be read off from them through 
divination will count as a reason for refusing to conduct a conversation near an 
ebony tree (Boyer, 2001, p. 69). In Uduk society, in contrast with Western society, 
this kind of reasoning will be understandable. To the extent that what is a delusion 
depends on what beliefs are socially prevalent in the context of attribution, cultural 
relativity suggests that being a delusion is a response-dependent property. 
Third, delusions are normatively assessable: to be deluded usually (if not 
necessarily) means that something is wrong. While this does not necessarily entail 
mind-dependence, if the norms to which the assessment of delusion is subject are 
in any way social, then the very existence of delusions would turn out to depend on 
our cultural modes of thought. In other words, the boundaries of delusion would be 
at least partly dependent on where we draw the lines. Hence, delusion would not be 
an individuatively independent kind. But are the norms that govern delusion social? 
Delusions may be subject to at least two kinds of norms, namely, medical 
norms and norms of rationality (Samuels, 2009). On the one hand, it is difficult 
not to accept that delusions are typically, if not always symptomatic of pathology 
— and even the least socially laden theories of mental disorder accept that the 
notion of harm should be understood in sociocultural terms (Wakefield, 1992). On 
the other hand, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that some, if not all, delusions 
are epistemically irrational — although whether norms of rationality are even 
partially socially constructed is much more controversial.
Against these threats, Samuels (2009) has argued that the line of reasoning 
present in the mind-dependence objections to the natural kind status of delusion 
conflates the metaphysics of delusion with its epistemology: 
The relevant metaphysical issue concerns the nature of delusions: roughly, what is 
it to be a delusion. The relevant epistemic question concerns the evidential basis 
for our judgements about delusion: roughly, the sorts of evidence we invoke in 
judging that someone is deluded. (p. 68, my emphases) 
However, even if such evidential basis were necessarily linked to culture-
bound folk epistemologies and mind-dependent norms, Samuels argues, there 
remains the modal point that this alone would not establish a necessary link 
between what it is to be a delusion and our judgments about what it is to be a 
delusion — the connection may be a contingent one.
Ultimately, the importance of investigating what kind of thing delusion is lies 
in determining if it constitutes an appropriate category for the purposes of scientific 
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inquiry, such as inductive generalization, empirical discovery, and mechanistic 
explanation. Toward that end, the essentialist demand that all and only members of 
a kind share intrinsic properties as a matter of metaphysical necessity may be overly 
restrictive, since many kinds that successfully figure in scientific practice, such as 
biological taxa, do not meet these conditions. Partly for this reason, the predominant 
opinion in philosophy of science is  that such a sortal notion of essence should 
be replaced by a merely causal notion that entails only the existence of a set of 
empirically discoverable causal mechanisms that explains the covariation of the 
characteristics or symptoms co-instantiated by instances of a kind. Such a refined 
(if mitigated) essentialism is exemplified in Richard Boyd’s (1991) homeostatic 
property cluster account, the most widely accepted model of natural kinds.
Settling the dispute about whether delusion constitutes a practical kind 
or a natural kind in the liberal sense will depend, then, on ascertaining through 
exploratory research whether delusion as a kind is individuated by a causal 
essence. A strong indication that this is the case would be for explanations of 
delusion to exhibit some kind of unity. So far, such unity remains a distant goal 
and the options are all still on the table, including the possibility that delusion 
as a generic kind picks out a merely practical distinction while some of its 
subtypes possess the individuative independence and causal unity required of 
natural kinds. However, even if the investigation of the neurobiological causes 
of delusion reveals that delusion as such is not nondisjunctively characterizable 
in the vocabulary of biological neuroscience, explanatory unity may be found at 
other levels of explanation. Causal explanations of delusion have mostly focused 
on computational processes at the cognitive level. Ultimately, however, given 
that many factors are implicated in delusion development, and the contribution of 
each in individual cases varies, seeking an explanation that integrates the various 
levels of description — from neurobiological to phenomenological — may turn 
out to be our best chance to arrive at a unified theory of delusion (Gerrans, 2014). 
Conclusion
Through the preceding examination of foundational problems involved in 
determining the nature of delusion, I have tried to show some of the reasons why 
philosophers have been progressively disregarding disciplinary boundaries and 
contributing to the debates outlined above. Especially, I have made an effort to 
justify the engagement of philosophers with the clinical literature on delusion, 
and the collaboration between philosophers and psychiatrists, which ideally 
is a two-way street: while philosophers profit from psychiatry inasmuch as the 
clinical literature provides real-life, as opposed to merely imaginary, cases for 
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philosophy of mind to engage with, philosophers can contribute not only by 
clarifying concepts and working out the implications of empirical results, but 
also in building explanatory models of delusion and suggesting new avenues 
for empirical research (e.g. Davies et al., 2001; Gerrans, 2014). The best way 
for philosophers to contribute to the understanding of the relevant phenomena, 
I suggest, is for us to heed Louis Sass’s (2004, p. 71) advice and resist the 
tendency to formulate issues and arguments in overly polarized terms and then 
to rely uncritically on these formulations in exploring the domain of inquiry, so 
as not to actually hinder our understanding of phenomena which are fraught with 
ambiguities and complexities that defy standard conceptualizations.
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Resumos
(A classificação, definição e ontologia do delírio)
Apesar de o delírio ser um dos conceitos centrais da psicopatologia, ainda 
escapa à conceptualização precisa. Neste artigo, apresento alguns problemas 
fundamentais a respeito da classificação e definição do delírio, bem como sobre 
seu estatuto ontológico. Por meio do exame desses problemas, tenho como objetivo 
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esclarecer a ambiguidade do termo clínico “delírio” e sua extensão, bem como 
fornecer pistas sobre o motivo de filósofos cada vez mais se juntarem a psiquia-
tras, psicólogos e neurocientistas na tarefa de chegar a uma compreensão global do 
delírio.
Palavras-chave: Delírio, nosologia, metafísica da psicopatologia, DSM-5
(Classification, définition et ontologie du délire)
Bien que le délire soit l'un des concepts centraux de la psychopathologie, il 
échappe encore à la conceptualisation précise. Dans cet article, je présente quelques 
problèmes fondamentaux concernant la classification et la définition du délire, ainsi 
que son statut ontologique. Par le biais de l'examen de ces problèmes, je cherche à 
faire la lumière sur l'ambiguïté du terme clinique « délire » et son ampleur, ainsi qu’à 
fournir des indices sur la raison pour laquelle les philosophes se joignent de plus en 
plus aux efforts des psychiatres, psychologues et chercheurs en neurosciences pour 
parvenir à une compréhension globale du délire.
Mots clés: Délire, nosologie, métaphysique de la psychopathologie, DSM-5
(La clasificación, definición y ontología del delirio)
Aunque el delirio sea uno de los conceptos centrales de la psicopatología, este 
aún se escapa de la conceptualización precisa. En este artículo, presento cuestiones 
fundamentales relacionadas a la clasificación y definición del delirio, así como 
también acerca de su estado ontológico. A través del examen de estas cuestiones, mi 
objetivo es dilucidar la ambigüedad del término clínico ‘delirio’ y su extensión, así 
como proporcionar pistas sobre por qué los filósofos se unen cada vez más a los 
psiquiatras, psicólogos y neurocientíficos en el esfuerzo por llegar a una comprensión 
global del delirio.
Palabras claves: Delirio, nosología, metafísica de la psicopatología, DSM-5
(Klassifizierung, Definition und Ontologie des Wahns)
Obwohl der Wahn eines der zentralen Konzepte der Psychopathologie ist, 
konnte ein genauer Begriff bisher nicht erstellt werden. In dieser Arbeit stellen wir 
grundlegende Probleme bezüglich der Klassifizierung und Definition des Wahns, 
sowie seinen ontologischen Status dar. Unsere Problemuntersuchung hat zum Ziel, 
die Mehrdeutigkeit des medizinischen Begriffs „Wahn“ und seine Erweiterungen zu 
erläutern, sowie mögliche Antworten auf die Frage zu finden, warum Philosophen 
sich zunehmend Psychiatern, Psychologen und Neurowissenschaftlern anschließen, 
um ein umfassendes Verständnis des Wahns zu erlangen.
Stichwörter: Wahn, Nosologie, Metaphysik der Psychopathologie, DSM-5
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(谵妄症的分类，定义及其存在)
虽然谵妄症是精神病症的主要概念，但是它的概念依然不是很清楚。本论
文对谵妄症的分类和定义方面的一些基本问题进行探讨，并且分析了它的本体
论的一些问题。通过调查分析这些问题，作者尝试澄清谵妄症这个临床术语的
模糊性和它的外延，了解驱使精神分析学，心理学，神经科学，众多学科的学
者联合起来，试图对谵妄症进行一个全面的理解的哲学背景。 
关键词: 谵妄症，疾病分类学，精神病理学的形而上学，DSM-5
